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This thesis presents an implementation of
multiprogramming and process management functions for the
security kernel of a distributed multiprocessor system. The
implementation is based on a family of operating systems
designed to provide controlled access in a microcomputer
network to data "bases containing multiple levels of
sensitive information.
Multiprogramming improves system efficiency and creates
a virtual environment which frees the remainder of the
operating system from a dependence on processor
configuration. Processor management coordinates the
asynchronous interaction of system processes.
This implementation describes a processor multiplexing
technique for a distributed kernel and presents a virtual
interrupt mechanism. Its structure is loop free to permit
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The application of contemporary microprocessor
technology to the design of large-scale multiple processor
systems offers many potential benefits. The cost of
high-power computer systems could he reduced drastically?
fault tolerance in critical real-time systems could he
improved? and computer services could he applied in areas
where their use is not now cost effective. Desi^nin^ such
systems presents many formidable problems that have not been
solved by the specialized single processor systems available
today .
Specifically, there is an increasing demand for computer
systems that provide protected storage and controlled access
for sensitive information to be shared among a wide range of
users. Data controlled by the Privacy Act, classified
Department of Defence (DoD) information, and the
transactions of financial institutions are but a few of the
areas which require protection for multiple levels of
sensitive information. Multiple processor systems which
share data are well suited to providing such services - if
the data security problem can be solved.
A solution to these problems - a multiprocessor system
design with verifiable information security - is offered in
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a family of secure, distributed multi-microprocessor
operating- systems designed by C'Connell and Richardson [1] .
A subset of this family, the Secure Archival Storage System
(SASS) [2,3], has been selected as a testbed for the general
design. SASS will provide consolidated file storage for a
network of possibly dissimilar "host" computers. The system
will provide controlled, shared access to multiple levels of
sensitive information (figure 1).
This thesis presents an implementation of a basic
monitor for the 'Connell-Richardson family of operating
systems. The monitor provides multiprogramming and process
management functions specifically addressed to the control
of physical processor resources of SASS. Concurrent thesis
work [4] is developing a detailed design for a security





























The general family design is composed of a supervisor
and a security kernel. The supervisor provides dynamic
linking, a discretionary security policy, demand memory
management, and a hierarchical file system in support of the
user. The security kernel manages physical resources to
provide scheduling, interprocess communication and
synchronization, and a non-discretionary security policy.
The design is loop-free to permit the implementation of
system subsets ran^inp from a simple monitor to a general
purpose computer utility.
SASS is a subset of this system and does not require use
of several higher levels of the general system design.
Dynamic linking, demand segmentation, transient prccesses,
and a user domain are not necessary for its intended
operation, and are excluded. The software of SASS is
partitioned into two domains. The security kernel, which is
the most privileged domain, manages system physical
resources in a manner designed to prevent unauthorized
information flow, regardless of action taken by other
elements in the system. The less privileged domain, the
supervisor [2], provides each host with a hierarchical file
system in which it may store and retrieve files and share
them with other hosts. The hosts send commands and transfer
files via bidirectional digital links. SASS was designed for
14

implementation of currently available microprocessor
hardware. Multiprogramming is used to improve system
efficiency and to create a virtual environment which frees
the remainder of the operating system from a dependence on
the physical processor configuration. Processor management
provides a means of coordinating the interaction of the
asynchronous processes which comprise the system. This
implementation employs a processor multiplexing technique
for a distributed kernel and presents a virtual interrupt
mechanism. The modular, hierarchical structure of the
software is loop-free to support system expansion to higher
level functions .
Although the primary goal of the design is security, the
clean, logical, process-oriented structure of SASS offers
other benefits as well, including fault tolerance, resource
configuration independence, and efficiency.
B. COMPUTER SECURITY
The need for providing protection for information within
a computer system is well documented. Development of the
security kernel technology [5,6], has transformed the
operating1 system designer's approach from a fame of wits
with penetrators into a methodical design process.
In general, security is provided by providing protection
for information in accordance with a specific protection
15

policy. In the case cf computer security this is
accomplished by controlling the access of people to
information. Although this protection can be provided by
external controls (e.g., confining the computer system and
all its users within a physical security perimeter), this
method is inefficient and prone to human error. Furthermore,
a distributed computer network will probably be dispersed
over too wide an area to be physically confined. Supported
by the security kernel approach, an internal protection
mechanism controlled by the computer operating system is a
feasible solution.
1 . Reference Monitor
The concept of protection is realized within the
computer system by the implementation of a mathematical
model of information security. This model is based on an
abstract representation of security called the Reference
Monitor [7], The Reference Monitor describes a mechanism for
controlling the access of subjects to objects, based on a










Every time a subject attempts to access an object,
the Peference Monitor checks to determine if the subject has
authorization to perform the desired operation (e.*., write,
read^ on the object. If the policy does not authorize the
access, the Reference Monitor will prevent the subject from
performing the requested operation. This mechanism is
realized within the operating system as the security kernel.
Several system features are required in order for the
mechanism to function correctly.
First, every reference to information (i.e., every
access to primary memory by the processor) must go through
the security kernel.
Second, the implementation of the security kernel must
be an exact representation of the mathematical model of
information security.
Third, the security kernel must be tamper-proof.
2. Security Policy
The security policy to be enforced by the computer
system consists of external laws, rules, regulations, etc.,
which establish permissable information access independent
of the computer system. Therefore, a computer system will be
secure only with respect to a specific security policy. The
security kernel concept supports a broad range of security
policies that can be divided into two classes,




Non-discretionary security policy uses labels to
insure only permissable access of subjects to objects is
provided. Object labels reflect object sensitivity and
subject labels reflect subject authorization. (For example,
National Security Policy labels include Unclassified,
Secret, etc.). A non-discretionary security policy provides
compromise protection (from unauthorized reading , integrity
protection (from unauthorized modification), and must
prevent information leaks resulting from indirect access to
unauthorized information as well. A non-discretionary
security policy requires that all subjects and objects have
labels. Most contemporary computer systems do not provide
this explicit labeling and therefore implicitly make all
access permissable.
b. Discretionary Policy
Discretionary security policy provides a finer
division of access by allowing individual subjects to decide
which of the permissable accesses, determined by
non-discretionary policy, will actually be allowed (e.£.,
DoD's "need to know"). Many contemporary computer systems
support discretionary security policy with access control





3. Security Kernel Design
By careful interpretation of the mathematical model
of the Reference Monitor, the security kernel is designed to
be a subset of operating system functions. Kernel primitives
form an interface between this subset and the remainder of
the system. If these primitives are implemented correctly,
their use guarantees that information will be protected in
compliance with system security policy, regardless of any
action taken by other portions of the operating system or by
the user. A more detailed discussion of the security model
is provided in [4,5,6],
C. SC0P5 OF THESIS
In this chapter a subset of the general operating
system design, the Secure Archival Storage System (SASS),
was described. The concept of information security was
examined and the security kernel was presented as a
technically sound approach to the problem of providing
internal computer security.
Chapter Two will discuss the design goals of this
operating system. Functional design requirements will be
developed and the issues of physical resource management and
performance will be traced to specific attributes desired in
system hardware. The rationale behind the ultimate selection
of Zilog's Z3002 Microprocessor and Z££l£ memory management
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unit (MMU) for use in the SASS test bed implementation of
this operating system will be discussed.
Chapter Three will describe the high level design of
SASS with an emphasis on the security kernel design. A view
of the user (computer host) environment as a collection of
cooperating processes will be presented, and the
hierarchical structure of the distributed kernel modules
will be examined in detail.
Chapter Four will present an implementation of the SASS
security kernel modules that provide multiprogramming and
processor management. The construction of the virtual
machine environment will be described and the advantages of
a two-level scheduling mechanism will be explained.
Finally an evaluation of this implementation will be
presented with recommendations for improving the design and
suggestions for follow on work.
20

II. OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN CONCEPTS
The kernel primitives providing multiprogramming and
process management form one of the smallest and most basic
subsets in the family of operating systems designed "by
O'Connell and Richardson [4]. As developed here they were
implemented specifically to support SASS. In general the
same kernel primitives will support all members of this
design family.
Before discussing the high level design of the SASS
security kernel and presenting an implementation of these
primitives, it is useful to investigate the general design
methodology applied to the development of this operating
system. In this chapter the design goals of SASS will be
analyzed and traced to functional requirements and hardware
attributes considered necessary or desirable in support of
the system's design goals. It is recognized that the
operating system user Will probably not address these issues
directly when specifying system design goals. The material
presented here concerns the approach of the system designer





Two issues confront the operating system designer.
First, he must provide system functions which support the
services requested by tne user. These functional
requirements affect the logical design of the system.
Second, he must address issues of cost and performance. Cost
and other management considerations will not he addressed
here. Performance issues concern the management of physical
resources and ultimately can he reduced to hardware
requirements .
There is a considerable amount of literature devoted to
the development of the functional design of operating
systems. Dijkstra [8] has described a technique for reducing
the complexity of the design by allocating operating system
activities to a number of cooperating processes. Process
structure is simplified in turn by defining its functions in
levels of increasing abstraction and by applying the
principles of structured programming.
Madnick and Donovan [9] have described an operating
system as a hierarchical extended machine. Program modules
are added to the system hardware to provide many extended
instructions in addition to the hardware instructions
available on the bare machine. In complex systems one
extended machine may be constructed upon another to form a
system composed of levels of abstract (virtual) machines.
22

Saltzer [12] and Reed [11, 12] have discussed the
advantages of resource visualization and have described
some useful interprocess communication mechanisms. The
general design strategies presented in this and other
research aid the operating system designer in developing
system functions in a clean, logical, verifiable design.
The selection of an appropriate computer architecture,
which supports both functional requirements and the
efficient management of physical resources, often proves to
be a more difficult issue. Frequently operating systems
design is shaped by the capabilities of system hardware.
This may be a result of performance limitations or cost of
available hardware, but often this course is taken because
traditionally, system design begins with hardware. Since a
primary ?oal in operating systms design is to create a
specific operational environment for the user, it would
appear to be preferable to design from the desired
environment "down to" the hardware. In this way all
components of the system, software and hardware alike, are
evaluated in the light of the ultimate goals of the system,
and any incompa tabili ties between required functions and
hardware capabilities will be discovered early in the
design. Then, if modifications are required, design changes
can be made at a high level which will preserve design
integrity. LSI technology currently provides a wide variety
of relatively inexpensive microprocessor hardware from which
23

to select specific physical components, furthermore, it is
often feasible to design special purpose hardware to
specification. So the traditional restrictions on hardware
versatility in systems design need not apply in many cases
to microprocessor systems.
In summary, the top-down design philosophy can be
applied to operating systems design in the following manner:
1. Identify general and specific design goals
2. Derive functional design requirements.
3. Identify performance requirements.
4. Select system hardware.
5. Develope kernel software.
6. Develope the remainder of the 0/S software
B. GENERAL DESIGN GOALS
Although many design goals depend upon specific system
application, there appear to he some attributes desirable in
all operating systems.
1 . logical Structure
Computer system design is an engineering problem and
the tools of the engineering design process should be
applied to the development of software as well as hardware
[13] . Clarity should be a major goal of any design for if
the operating system cannot be understood easily it will be
difficult to test, difficult to maintain, and its
correctness will always be in doubt. A sound enginering
design philosophy is not guaranteed to generate error free
24

systems, but if system functions are cleanly organized and
well understood, then it is likely that there will be few
errors and these can "be corrected without difficulty when
discovered .
2. Fault Tolerence
If an operating system is to he reliable, the
software it uses must be protected from damage whenever
possible. In particular, tasks performed by the system
should be isolated from another so that a malfunction (e.g.,
as the result of hardware failure) in one task has no effect
on others.
3. Efficiency
The efficient use of physical resources (processors,
memory, periphals, etc.) continues to be a primary design
goal. However, since hardware is no longer the scarce,
expensive commodity it once was, a concern for overall
system efficiency (i.e., higher thorugh-put, faster response
time) may be more important. With appropriate component
selection many software functions can be replaced by
hardware functions that can provide an improvement in system
performance at a small additional hardware expense.
C. SPECIFIC DESIGN GOALS
The family of operating systems designed by O'Connell
and Richardson provides all of the services expected of a
25

state of the art, general purpose operating system, fany of
these general services are not necessary in the SASS subset
of the family. The number of processes required by SASS is
determined by the number of host computers linked to SASS
hardware. A design choice was made to fix this number at
system generation time. Therefore dynamic process management
is not required? SASS processes exist for the life of the
system. A primary function of SASS is the transfer of files
between host computers and SASS via bidirectional digital
links. As a result, the system will have a lew transaction
rate, and the relatively fast response time desired in a
time-sharing system is not required here. Sass dees not
provide programming services to users; the system strictly
manages an archival storage system. This eliminates the
requirement for a user domain and because the demands on
primary memory are not excessive, there is no need for
dynamic memory management.
Other services of the general system provide
essential support to SASS. These services include I/O
management, file management, and the physical resource
management and information protection functions provided by
the security kernel.
The SASS requirement to provide multiple host computers
(users) with controlled, shared access to a multilevel
secure "data warehouse" leads to several design goals. These
include: internal security to proctect information in a
26

distributed computer network? configuration independence for
system versatility; and a subsetting capability to support





A unique feature of SASS is the specification of
multilevel security as a primary design goal. Multilevel
security provides controlled sharing of information of
varying sensitivity amon^ many users in accordance with an
access policy implemented internally by the operating
system. It is essential that a system supporting a remotely
accessed data base containing information of different
access classes be provided with an internally enforced
security policy.
2 . Configuration Independence
The resource configuration of a multicomputer system
is highly changeable. Processors are added and removed;
memory is reconfigured; interconnection schemes are altered
and peripherial equipment is changed. The operating system
of such a design should be sufficiently flexible to permit
maintenance and to allow for growth and reconfiguration
without requiring drastic system redesign or noticeably
affecting the user's environment.
3. Sub-set tiny Capability
Operating system "sub-setting" refers to the ability
to form meaningful subsets of the design by eliminating many
27

of the services that can be provided by the system without
affecting the usefulness of the remainder of the system.
Sub-setting permits the system to be tailored to fit a
number of specific designs ranging from a simple monitor to
a full service time-shared computer utility. The
implementation presented in this thesis creates a monitor
that provides multiprogramming and processor management.
This subset supports more complex family members of the
design such as SASS.
D. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
In a top-down approach to design, goals are clarified
and defined by requirements which describe either the system
functions or address cost and performance issues (hardware
requirements). The functional requirements defined below
support the specific design goals of SASS and provide
features desirable in any operating system, such as a
logical structure, fault tolerance, and efficiency of
operation .
1 . Functional Requirements
Functional requirements define services which must
be provided to support the user's environment,
a. Process Organization
By designing an operating system as a collection
of cooperating processes, system complexity can be greatly
29

reduced [8] . This is because the asynchronous nature of the
system can be structured logically by representing each
independent sequential task as a process and by providing
interprocess communication mechanisms to prevent races and
deadlocks during process interactions.
The notion of a process provides a complete
description of all instructions executed and all memory
locations referenced during the performance of a task. A
process is defined by an address space and ar execution
point. The address space is the set of memory locations
which covld be accessed during process execution. fThe
process is viewed as a past, present and future "history" of
memory locations which actually were referenced.) The
execution point is the state of the processor at a ^iven
instant during process execution. In the abstract view, an
address space is defined by a collection to discrete points,
each representing a memory word. The process is described by
the path traced through this address space from process
creation to destruction. In figure 3 the main path traces
the process execution point as it moves from one instruction
(i.e., memory word) to another during process execution. The











Several advantages result from usin,? a process
oriented design. As a tool for dealing with the asynchronous
nature of system operation, processes provide a simple,
logical, high-level structure for the design. For example,
the Secure Archival Storage System supports each host with
three processes: a I/O Manager, a File Manager, and a Memory
Manager, which interact to provide secure file management
services to the host. This interaction will be described
further in the next chapter. Since each process is confined
to a secific address space, tasks are isolated from one
another and system fault tolerance is improved. 3y providing
an internal representation for each user, a process nicely
fits the definition of a "subject" in the Reference Monitor






The address space of a process is composed of a
collection of segments. A segment is a logical collection of
information (e.g., procedure, data structure, file, etc.)
and is the basic logical object of this design. Figure 4
illustrates the tvo-dimenti onal nature of the segment
address. Each segmert consists of an arbitrary region of
memory containing a sequence of words with conventional
linear addresses. Two-diment ional addressing frees
information from dependence on a particular memory location







m p m . word
The descriptor segment provides a list of
descriptors for all segments in a process address space. In
addition, segmentation supports information sharing since a
segment may belong to more than one address space.
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Segmention also provides a means of associating logical
attributes and labels with ea^h segment, such as access
class, domain, etc. This feature supports segments as




Abstraction provides a method for reducing
problem complexity by applying a general solution to a
collection of specific cases [14]. Structured programming
provides a tool for creating abstraction in software design.
By strictly applying two special rules in addition to the
general principles of structured programming, a structure
consisting of levels of increasing abstraction can be
constructured .
First, calls cannot be outward toward higher
levels of abstraction. This frees lower levels from a
dependence on higher levels by creating a loop-free
structure [15] and results in a design which is capable of
having subsets.
Second, calls to lower levels must be by special
entry points or gates. Each level of abstraction creates an
virtual hierarchical machine [9]. The sate to each level
provides a set of instructions created for that virtual
machine. Thus higher levels may use the resources of lower
levels only by applying the instruction set of a lower level
machine. (At domain boundaries, use of gates is strictly
32

enforced "by a ring-crossing mechanism; otherwise gate use is
implicit in the structure of the software.) Once a level of
abstraction has been created, the details cf its
implementation are no longer an issue. Instead users see
layers of virtual machines
, each defined by its extended
instruction set.
Each process used in SASS is designed in levels
of abstraction. When the rules of abstraction are applied to
level 2 , the physical resources of the system, these
resources are "virtuali zed" . Thus the first level of
abstraction creates "virtual processors", "virtual memory",
and "virtual devices" from the system's hardware. At each
higher level the detail of the design is reduced. The gate
at the boundary between the highest level of the security
kernel avA the lowest level of the supervisor provides a
mechanism for isolating the kernel as well as insuring that
each memory access is via kernel software. This mechanism is




The first levels of abstraction above system
hardware create virtual representations of physical
resources (virtual processors, virtual memory, virtual
periphals). Since upper levels of the design operate on
these virtual resources, rather than on physical resources,
most of the design (i.e., everything above resource
33

vi rtuali za tion levels) is independent of the physical
configuration of the system. Ey providing virtual to real
resource "binding in the kernel, and by enforcing entry into
kernel levels with the Gatekeeper, SAS5 protects physical
resources from tampering and insures memory access only via
the kernel. As a result, the kernel modules of each process
will guarantee that the system's non-discretionary security
policy is enforced. Including in the kernel only those
functions essential to system security keeps it small and
reduces the joh of verification to manageable proportions.
2. Hardware Requirements
Virtual resources are created by the multiplexing of
various types of information on a physical resource.
Multiplexing can be defined as the use of a single resource
for different purposes at different times. Tor example the
physical bus lines can he used both for addresses and data
during different times during the machine cycle. Similarly,
logical users of a hardware system can share rescurces. The
ability to multiplex processors and memory efficiently
provides a mechanism for the virtuali za tion of these
physical resources.
a. Processor Virtuali zat ion.
A virtual processor is a data structure that
contains a complete description of a process in execution on
a physical processor at a given instant. This description is
34

contained in the process execution point. The address space
of the process must "be accessable to the virtual processor
when it is loaded on (hound to) a CPU. To provide a useful
vi rtuali za tion capability, the CPU must have the ability to
efficiently multiplex process exection points and address
spaces (i.e., it must support multiprogramming).
b. Memory Visualization.
In many memory handling schemes Process cannot
run unless the entire address space is loaded in primary
memory. This may require a lar^e main memory or it may
restrict the size of the address space. An alternative plan
requires an 'operating system which manages primary and
secondary memory to create the illusion of a memory which is
larger than the system's primary memory. Since the larger
memory is only an illusion, it is often called virtual
storage. The logical, relocatable, information objects
created by memory sepmentaion, provide an essential memory
multiplexing mechanism for the efficient implementation of
virtual storage.
c. Protection Domains
An essential requirement of internal security is
that the security kernel be isolated from other elements of
the system. This can be accomplished by the construction of
protection domains. Protection domains are used to arrange
process address spaces into rings of different privilege.
This arrangement is a hierarchical structure in which the
35

most privi leaped domain is the innermost ring. The structure
essentially divides the address space into levels of





Protection rings may be created in software, but
a hardware implementation, where pate use is enforced by
hardware, is much more efficient [16].
The protection provided by the rinp structure is
not a security policy. (Security protection is implemented
by a lattice structure known to the Non-di screticnary
Security module in the kernel.) It does, however, enforce
the hierarchy of the virtual machine by creating a
privileged kernel ring within the supervisor rinp.
E. HARDWARE SELECTION
The manifestation of an operatinp system desipn is, of
course, software in execution on system equipment. If system
36

equipment must be selected early in the design, care must be
taken to insure that overall system design goals are
compatible with actual hardware capabilities. If design
goals must be met (e.g., the enforcement of internal
security in SASS), then actual hardware selection should be
made late in the design process. Then, even if a poor
hardware choice is made, the penalty for correcting it will
be small, since only the lowest level of the design (where
resources are virtualized) need be changed. In any case the
design of the operating system and the design or selection
of system hardware must proceed in concert.
1. Zilog Z8001
The ZP001 is a general purpose 15-bit microprocessor
[17] with an architecture which supports memory segmentation
and two-domain operations. It was selected as the target
machine for implementation of the system because of the full
range of support and close match it provided to design
requirements. These supporting features are described below.
a. Memory Segmentation
The CPU can directly access SM bytes of address
space using a memory segmentation capability provided
externally by a Memory Management Unit (Z8010 MMU) . The
23-bit address required to address 8M bytes is a logical two
dimensional address consisting of a ?-bit segment number and
a 16-bit offset. The memory management unit converts this
into a 24-bit address for the physical memory. The address
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space can be divided into as many as 12S relocatable
segments containing up to 64K bytes each. Each memory
segment can be assigned several attributes which provide
memory access protection (read only , system mode only
(i.e., ring #), execute only, etc.) and memory management
data (changed, referenced). With these capabilities the
Z8001 CPU can support all requirements for segmentation,
memory virtual! zation and protection domains.
I. Multiprogramming
Processor multiplexing is supported by the CPU's
multiprogramming capabilities. MULTI-MICRO instructions aid
in establishing a synchronization mechanism (by mutual
exclusion) between multiple processors. Seperate stack, data
and code address spaces are maintained for each ring of
operation. The load multiple instruction allows the contents
of registers to be saved and loaded efficiently. These
features permit efficient storing and loading of process
execution points .
Address space multiplexing is also supported but
is somewhat inefficient. In some systems, such as Multics
[IS], a descriptor base register (DBR) is provided to point
to a process descriptor segment in memory, so changing the
address space of the physical processor is accomplished
merely by changing the E3R. Since the ZS001 CPU implements
the descriptor segment as a collection of descriptor
registers in the MMU, all of the descriptors for the address
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space must be saved and loaded to change processes. This can
make processor multiplexing (multiprogramming;) quite
inefficient. In the worst case, when the entire KMU is saved
and loaded, a process switch will take about 2 ms . It may be
possible to improve on this performance by increasing the
number of MMU's in the system. Then the address space can be
changed simply by switching control to another MMU.
c. Two-Domain Operations
The ZS001 CPU can operate in either system mode
or normal mode. In the system mode all operations are
allowed, but in the user mode, certain system instructions
are prohibited.
, The system call instruction allows
controlled entry to the system mode. This two-domain
instruction capability supports the two domain sturcture of
SASS by providing- a single controlled entry into the kernel
(SYSTEM CALL instruction). The descriptors contained in the
MMU registers provide the capability to partition process
address spaces into supervisor and kernel domains.
2. Selection Rationale
The characteristics listed above - processor
multiplexing support, a memory segmentation capability,
multiple domain insturctions , and multiple domain memory
partitioning - are features which are essential to an
efficient implementation of SASS. The Z£eei has other
desirable features: vectored and non-vectored interrupts,
larg-e, powerful instruction set, many data types, etc. These
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attributes make the Zilog system a suitable choice as a bare
machine for the Secure Archival Storage System.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a description of the
methodology employed in the design and specification of
SASS. In particular it was noted that a top-down design
philosophy most effectively supported implementation of
system design ^oals. Requirements supporting the primary
design goal of internal security and other general and
specific goals were defined and traced to desired hardware
capabilities. Finally, capabilities of Zilog's Z~2il
microprocessor which support the SASS design were described.
Chapter Three will provide an overview of the SASS
design. The design will be described from a process
viewpoint and the hierarchical structure of the distributed
kernel will be examined.
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III. SECURITY KERNEL DESIGN
The high level design of the Secure Archival Storage
System car. be described by a collection of cooperating
processes. The use of processes to perform operating system
functions greatly simplifies the problem of describing the
asynchronous manner in which services are requested.
A. P?0CESS VIEW
There are two kinds of processes within SASS, supervisor
processes and kernel processes. Supervisor processes provide
high level services to host computers [2]. Certain functions
of the operating system are distributed throughout all of
these processes; that is, supervisor processes logically
share a collection of distributed kernel modules. Kernel
processes provide specialized services within the operating
system. The system user is not aware of the existence of
these processes, but they are called upon, within the kernel
domain, by supervisor processes to perform necessary





One pair of supervisor processes, an I /C Manager and
a File Manager, represents each computer host supported by
SASS.
The File Manager controls SASS and directs all
interaction between SASS and computer hosts in order to
maintain a structure of hierarchical files on behalf of each
host It interprets commands received from hosts via the I/O
Managpr ard coordinates the execution of requested services
with assistance from the I/O Manager and the Memory Manager
(described below).
The I/O Manap-er transfers information via a link
between each host and SASS. Data is transfered by fixed-size
packets in command, data, and synchronization formats. The
I/O Manager provides only a transfer service and does not
interpre t the da ta
.
2. Kernel ?roce<^se^
The two kernel processes used by SASS are the Memory
Manager and the Idle process. The Memory Manager controls
primary and secondary memory. The design of this process is
the topic of concurrent thesis research [3] . The Memory
Manager transfers segments between primary and secondary
memory in response to requests from supervisor processes.
The Idle process defines the "no work" state of the
system. SASS attempts to schedule useful work on system
processors whenever possible. Only when there is no work to
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"be done, (i.e., no commands pending from hosts) will this
process be called upon to execute.
3 . Host Environment
Host computers view SASS as a remote data warehouse
where they may store and retrieve files (figure 6). Each
host is provided with a virtual file hierarchy constructed
from directory and data files. A pair of SASS supervisor
processes (an I/O Manager and a File Manager) provide each
host with a set of commands by which it may store and
retrieve files in its virtual file system and share files
with other hosts. The distributed kernel functions of each
process control the physical resources of the system in










E. VIRTUAL MACHINE VIEW
The distributed modules of the security kernel create a
virtual hierarchical machine which controls process
interactions and manages physical processor resources. The
kernel is not aware of the details of process tasks. It
knows each process only "by a name (viz., an entry number in
a table) and provides processes with scheduling and
interprocess communication services cased on this process
identifier. All supervisor processes share the modules of
this virtual hierarchical machine (Figure ?).
The kernel is constructed in layers of abstraction. Each
layer, or level, builds upon the resources created at lower
levels. The rules of abstraction described in Chapter 2 were
applied to the design of this structure. Level 2 is the tare
machine which provides the physical resources (processors
and storage) upon which the virtual machine is constructed.
The remainder of this chapter will describe the level of
visualization (or layer of abstraction) created hy each
distributed kernel module.
1 . Inner Traffic Controller Module
Ievel-1 of this virtual machine is the Inner Traffic
Controller Module. This module creates a set of virtual
processors with the extended instruction set: SIGNAL, WAIT,

























SIGNAL and WAIT provide an int erprocessor
communication mechanism used within the kernel to provide
multiprogramming. These instructions invoke the level-1
scheduling- procedure, GETWORK, which multiplexes virtual
processors on a physical processor.
SWAF_VEBR and IDLE are instructions invoked from
level-2 by the Traffic Controller Module to schedule
processes on a virtual processor.
SETJTPREEMPT and TEST_VPRESfPT create a virtual
processor interrupt mechanism. SST_V?RSEMPT is invoked ^rom
level-? when the traffic controller desires to load a new
process on a virtual processor that is not scheduled.
T5STJTPRE2MFT is invoked by the C-atekeeper of each
distributed process upon every exit from the kernel domain.
The Gatekeeper unmasks virtual interrupts by testing the
interrupt flag of the scheduled virtual processor. If the
flag* is set, a virtual interrupt handler is invoked,
otherwise the process enters the supervisor domain normally.
RUNNINC_VF is invoked from level-2 to provide the
Traffic Controller with the identity of the currently
scheduled virtual processor. The identity of a particular
processor must be known in the virtual environment, just as




2. T^af^ic Controller Module
The Traffic Controller resides at level-2. It
manages the scheduling of processes en virtual processors by
invoking the extended instructions of the virtual processors
in level-1. In addition to implementing the level-2
scheduling algorithm, the Traffic Controller creates the
extended instruction set: ADVANCE, AWAIT, and PPOCESS_CLASS
.
ADVANCE and AWAIT are used to implement eventcounts
and sequencers [11], an inter-processor communication (IPC)
mechanism invoked by the supervisor. Although SIGNAL and
WAIT provided an adequate interprocessor synchronization
mechanism within kernel, Parks [2] determined that
supervisor process synchronization would be more effectively
served in the secure environment of SASS by the use of
eventcounts .
PROCESS_CLASS is invoked from level-3. It returns
the label, subject access class, of the current process for
determining a subject-object relation.
a. Scheduling
Scheduling functions are divided between the
Inner Traffic Controller and the Traffic Controller. The
Inner Traffic Controller multiplexes virtual processors on a
CPU. The Traffic Controller schedules processes on virtual
processors
.
The division of the scheduling algorithm between
these two levels simplifies its design, because it seperates
4?

the issues of virtual processor management
(multiprogramming) from virtual memory management [12] . A
design choice was made to provide each system CFU with a
small fixed set of virtual processors. Since the virtual
processor data base is shared by all system CPU's, it must
remain permaently in global memory.
The process data base, used to implement level-2
scheduling will be much larger. Since supervisor processors
are known to the entire system, this data must also be kept
in global memory. Because level-2 is subject to memory
management, this data could be kept on secondary storae-e and
moved to primary memory when requested.
SASS does not provide dynamic memory management,
therefore the two-level scheduling design presented here is
not essential to the design. However, the structure has beer.
provided in this implementation to support more complex
family members of the O'Connell-Richardsor. design. Figure 8
illustrates the two levels of scheduling employed by the
distributed kernel.
The two virtual processors (i^em_iv'/?r_VP and
Idle_VP in Figure 8) are permanently bound to kernel
processes and are not in contention for process scheduling.
The remaining VP's are temporarily bound tc supervisor
processes as determined by the Traffic Controller. If no
supervisor process is available, the Traffic Controller
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invokes the Inner Traffic Controller (IDLE) which leads an
Idle process on the virtual processor.
The Inner Traffic Controller schedules virtual
processors on the physical processor. Heady virtual
processors with temporarily hound idle processes (VP #1 and
VP #2 in Figure 6) will he scheduled only to give an Idle
process away for a supervisor process (i.e., when virtual
preempt flag is set). The Idle process will actually run
when the virtual processor to which it is permanently hound
(the Idle-VF in Figure 5) is scheduled. This will happen
only when all other VP's are waiting or temporarily hound to









3. Non-r iscretionary Security Module
The Non-Discretionary Security module in level-3
reflects the system's security policy. It compares two
labels, subject and object access classses, passed to it by
other modules, and returns the relationship of the labels
based on a lattice structure known to it. To perform this
function it provides the extended instruction, RELATION,
which is used by the Event Manager and the Segment Manager
to determine access permission. These modules make decisions
about access based on the relationships: equal, less than,
greater than, and not related. The Non-discretionary
Security module is the only module which interprets the
labels themselves. A different security policy (e.g.,
Privacy Act vs DOC) can be implemented simply by chansins
the lattice structure used in this module.
4. Event Manager Module
The Event Manager is a level-3 module invoked by
supervisor processes via the gatekeeper. This module creates
a set of extended instructions: AIVANCE, AWAIT, EEAI and
TICKET. It determines the access permission of desired
interprocess communications and obtains a global handle from
a Memory Manager data base where event data is stored. If
access is permitted, the event manager passes this handle,
which identifies the event, to the Traffic Controller where
the appropriate event count instruction is invoked. For
sequencer operations the Memory Manager is invoked directly.
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The use of the handle is necessary "because of the design
choice to store event data in a data base of the Memory
Manager [3]. This insures that inter-domain IPC does not
violate SAS5 security policy.
5. Segment Manager Module
The Segment Manager also resides in level-3. This
module creates a set of extended instructions for
manipulating segments. These instructions are: CREATE,
DELETE, SWAP_IN, SWAP_0UT, MAKE_KNOWN, and TERMINATE.
Modules of the supervisor domain invoke these instructions
to coordinate host support. CREATE and DELETE add and remove
segments from the system. SWA?_IN and SWAF_0UT cause a
segment to "be moved "between primary and secondary memory
(i.e., between a paged disk and contiguous memory).





The Gatekeeper exists on the boundary between the
kernel and supervisor domains. It provides the sole entry
point into the kernel domain, so when the execution point of
a process enters the kernel domain of its address space it
must do so through the Gatekeeper.
The hardware of the MMU partitions process address
spaces into two domains by setting the ring number (zero or
one) in each segment's
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attribute register. Software provided by the Gatekeeper






Save supervisor domain registers.
Save supervisor stack pointer in kernel stack
segmen t.





(i.e., umnask virtual interrupts).
2. Restore supervisor domain stack pointe
3. Restore supervisor domain registers.
4. Unmask hardware interrupts.
5. Return to process execution point in
in supervisor domain.
C. REVIEW
This chapter has described the high level design of the
Secure Archval Storage System kernel from two points of
view. In the process view the system is composed of pairs of
supervisor processes (an I/O Manager and a File Manager) for
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each host computer and a pair of kernel processes (a Memory
Manager and an Idle process) for each real processor in the
system. The supervisor processes provide high level services
to host computers while the kernel processes control system
memory resources and provide an idle system state.
Distributed kernel functions implement two levels of
scheduling, provide interprocessor synchronization and
communication, manage segments, and isolate and protect the
kernel domain of process address spaces. The distributed
kernel is constructed as a hierarchical virtual machine.
Evidence of the versitility of the loop-free, configuration
independent structure of this design can he observed in
concurrent thesis work in this area [19]. An Intel 8036
multiprocessor operating system implementation, based on the
same design, uses essentially the same virtual insturction
set described in this chapter. An implementation of the





Implementation of the distributed kernel was simplified
by the hierarchical structure of the design for it permitted
methodical bottom-up construction of a series of extended
machines. This approach was particularly useful in this
implementation since the bare machine, the ZS000
Developmental Module, was provided with only a small amount
of software support.
A. DEVFIOPMFNTAL SUPPORT
A. Zilog MCZ Developmental System provided support in
developing Z£00£ machine code. It provided floppy disk file
management, a text editor, a linker and a loader that
created an ima^e of each Z££0£ load module.
A Z8000 Developmental Module (DM) provided the necessary
hardware support for operation of a Z8?£2 non-segmented
microprocessor and 16K words (32K bytes) of dynamic HAM. It
included a clock, a USART, serial and parallel I/O support,
and a 2K PROM monitor.
The monitor provided access to processor registers and
memory, single step and break point functions, basic I/O




Since a segmented version of tne processor was not
available for system development, segmentation hardware was
si mulated in software as an MMU image (see Figure 9)
Although this data structure did not provide the hardware
support (traps) required to protect segments of the kernel













B. INNER TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
The Inner Traffic Controller runs on the bare machine to
create a virtual environment for the remainder of the
system. Only this module is dependent on the physical
processor configuration of the system. All higher levels see
only a set of running virtual processors. A kernel data
base, the Virtual Processor Table is used by the Inner
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Traffic Controller to create the virtual environment of this
first level extended machine. A source listing; of the Inner
Traffic Controller nodule is contained in Appendix A.
1. Virtual Processor Table (YPT)
The VFT is a data structure of arrays and records
that maintains the data used by the Inner Traffic Controller
to multiplex virtual processors on a real processor and to
create the extended instruction set that controls virtual
processor operation (see Figure 10). There is one table for
each physical processor in the system. Since this
implementation was for a uniprocessor system (the Zc£C£ DM),
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The table contains a LOCK which supports an
exclusion mechanism for a multiprocessor system. It was
provided in this implementation only to preserve the
generality of the design.
The Descriptor rase Register (DLR) binds a process
to a virtual processor. The DSK points to an MMU_IMAGE
containing* the list of descriptors for segments in the
process address space.
A virtual processor (V?) can be in ore of three





A running VF is currently scheduled on a real processor. A
ready VF is ready to be scheduled when selected by the
level-1 scheduling algorithm. A waiting VF is awaiting a
message from some other VF to place it in the ready list. In
the meantime it is not in contention for the real processor.
2. Ievel-1 Scheduling
Virtual processor state changes are initiated by the
inter-virtual—processor communication mechanisms, SIGNAL and
WAIT. These level-1 instructions implement the scheduling
policy by determining what virtual processor to bind to the
real processor. The actual binding and unbinding is
performed by a Processor switching mechanism called S :.vr AF_E5E
[10]. Processor switching implies that somehow the execution
point and address space of a new process are acquired by the
processor. Care must be taken to insure that the eld process
is saved and the new process loaded in an orderly manner. A
solution to this problem, suggested by Saltzer [10], is to
design the switching mechanism so that it is a corrmon
procedure having the same segment number in every address
space
.
In this implementation a processor register (R14)
was reserved within the switching mechanism for use as a
DBF.. Processor switching was performed by saving the old
execution point ( i.e., processor registers and flag control
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word), loading the new DBR and then loading the new
execution point. The processor switch occurs at the instant
the DBR is changed (see figure 12). Because the switching
procedure is distributed in the sane numbered segment in all
address spaces, the "next" instruction at the instant of the
switch will have the same offset no matter what address





























To convert this switching mechanism to segmented
hardware it is necessary merely to replace S.WAP_DEP with
special I/O block-move instructions that save the contents
of the M MU in the appropriate MMU_IMAGE and load the
contents of the new MMU_IMAGE into the MMU.
a. Getwork
SWAP_EBF. is contained within an internal Inner
Traffic Controller procedure called GETWORK. In addition to
multiplexing virtual processors on the CF TJ, GETWOHE
interprets the virtual processor status fla^s, IDLE and
PREEMPT, and modifies VP scheduling accordingly in an
attempt to keep the CPU busy doin? useful work.
There ar^ actually two classes of idle processes
within the system. One class belongs to the Traffic
Controller. Conceptually there is a ready level-2 idle
process for each virtual processor available to the Traffic
Controller for scheduling. When a running process blocks
itself, the Traffic Controller schedules the first ready
process. This will be an idle process if no supervisor
processes are in the ready list.
The second class of idle process exists in the
kernel. The kernel Idle process is permanently bound to the
lowest priority virtual processor.
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The distinction is made between these classes
"because of the need to keep the CPU "busy doing useful work
whenever possible. There is no need for GETWORK to schedule
a level-2 idle process that has been loaded on a virtual
processor, because the idle process does no useful work. The
virtual processor IDLE_FLAG indicates that a virtual
processor has been loaded with a level-2 idle process.
GETWORE will schedule this virtual processor only if the
PREEMPT flag is also set. The PREEMFT flag is a Signal from
the Traffic Controller that a supervisor process is now
ready to run.
When GETWORK can find no other ready virtual
processors with IDLE and PREEMPT flaes off, it will select
the virtual processor permanently bound to the kernel Idle
process. Only then will the Idle process actually run on the
CPU.
Getwork contains two entry points. The first, a
normal entry, resets the preempt interrupt return flag. (R£
is reserved for this purpose within GETWORK.) The second, a
hardware interrupt entry point, contains an interrupt
handler which sets the preempt interrupt returr flag. The
DBR (P.14) must also be set to the current value by any
procedure that calls GETWORK in order to permit the SWAF_EPR
portion of GETWORK to have access to the scheduled process's
62

address space. Upon completion of the processor switch,
GETWORK examines the interrupt return flag to determine
whether a normal return or an interrupt return is required.
The hardware interrupt entry point in GETWORK
supports the technique used to initialize the system. Each
process address space contains a kernel domain stack segment
used by S'VAF-DBR in GETWORK to save and restore 7F states.
For the same reason that SWAP-BBR is contained in a system
wide segment number, the stack segment in each process
address space will also have the same number (Segment #1 in
this implementation). Each stack segment is initially
created as though it's process had been previously preempted
by a hardware interrupt. This greatly- simplifies the
initialization of processes at system generation time. The
details of system initialization will be described later in
this chapter. It is important to note here, however, that
GETWORK must be able to determine whether it was invoked by
a hardware preempt interrupt or by a normal call, before it
can execute a return to the calling procedure. This is
because a hardware interrupt causes three items to be placed
on the system stack: the return location of the caller, the
flag control word, and the interrupt identifier, whereas a
normal call places only the return location on the stick.
Therefore, in order to clean up the stack, GETWORK must

execute an interrupt return (assembly ins truction : IRET ) if
entry was via the hardware preempt handler (i.e., R0 set).
This instruction will pop the three items off the stack and
return to the appropriate location. If the interrupt return
flag, R0, is off, a normal return is executed.
During normal operation, SWAP-DER manipulates
process stacks to save the old V? state and load the new V?
state. This action proceeds as fellows (figure 13):
1. The Flag Control Word (FCW). the Stac* Pointer (F:15)
and the preempt return flag (RB) are saved in the eld
VF's kernel stack.
2. The DBR (R14) is loaded with the new VF's LBR. This
permits access to the address space of the new process.
3. The Flag Control Word (FCW), the Stack Pointer (R15)
and the Interrupt Return Flag (R0), are loaded into the
appropriate CPU registers.
4. R0 is tested. If it is set, GETWORK will executp an
































By constructing GETWORI in this way. "both system
initialization and normal operations can be handled in the
same way. A high level GETWORK algorithm is giver, in figure
14.
3. Virtual Processor Instruction Set
The heart of the SASS scheduling mechanism is the
internal procedure, GETWORK. It provides a powerful internal
primitive for use by the virtual processors and greatly
simplifies the design of the virtual processor instruction
set. Virtual processor instructions perform three types of




GETWORK Procedure (DBR = R14)
Beffin
Reset Interrupt Return Flag (HP)




Save supervisor stack pointer
Set Interrupt Return Flag (R0)
Get first ready 7?
Do while not Select
If Idle flag is set then
if Preempt flag is set then
select
else







Save old V? registers in stack segment
Swap dbr (R14)
load new VP registers in stack segment





Restore supervvisor stack pointer







SIGNAL and WAIT provide synchronization and
communication "between virtual processors. They multiplex
virtual processors on a CPU to provide multiprogramming.
This implementation used a version of the signal and wait
algorithms proposed by Saltzer [12] . In the SASS design each
CPU is provided with a unique (fixed) set of virtual
processors. The interaction among virtual processors is a
result of multiprogramming them on the real processor. Only
one virtual processor is able to access the V?T at a time
because of the use of the VET. LOCK (S?IN_L0CK) to provide
mutual exclusion. Therefore race and deadlock conditions
will not develop and the signal pending switch used "by
Saltzer is not necessary.
This implementation also included message passing
mechamism not provided by Saltzer. The message slots
available for use by virtual processors are initially
contained in a queue pointed to by FREE-LIST. When a message
is sent from one VP to another, a message slot is removed
from the free list and placed in a FIFO message queue
belonging to the VP receiving the message. The head of each
VP's message queue is pointed to by MSG-LIST. Each message
slot contains a message, the IB of the sender, and a pointer




IDLE and SWAP_7DBR provide the Traffic Controller
with a means of scheduling processes on the running V?.
SET_VPREEMPT and TESTJTPREEMPT install a virtual
interrupt mechanism in each virtual processor. When the
Traffic Controller determines that a virtual processor
should five up its process because a higher priority process
is now ready, it sets the PREEMPT flag in that VP. Then,
even if an idle process is loaded on the VP, it will be
scheduled and will be loaded with the first ready process.
Test_VPreempt is a virtual interrupt unmasking mechanism
which forces a process to examine the preempt flag each time
it exists from the kernel.
a. Wait
WAIT provides a means for a virtual processor to
move itself from the running state to the waiting state when
it has no more work to do. It is invoked only for system
events that are always of short duration. It is supported by
three internal Procedures.
SPIN_LCCK enables the running VP to gain control
of the Virtual Processor Table. This procedure is only
necessary in a multiprocessor environment. The running V?
will have to wait only a short amount of time to gain




GETWORK loads the first eligible virtual
processor of the ready list on the real processor, before
this procedure is invoked, the running VF is placed in the
ready state. Eoth ready and running VP's are members of a
FIFO queue. GETWORK selects the first VF in this ready list,
loads it on the CPU, and places it in the running state.
When GETWORK returns, the first VF of the queue will always
he running and the second will he the first VF in the ready
queue
.
GET_FIRST_MESSAGE returns the first message of
the message list (also managed as a FIFO queue) associated
with the running VF. The action taken by WAIT is as follows:
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WAIT Procedure (Returns: Msg, Sender_ILM
Begin
Lock VPT (call SPINJLOCK1
If message list empty (i.e., no work) Then
Move VP from Running to Waiting state
Schedule first eligible Ready VP (call GSTWCBin
end if
(NOTE: process suspended here until
it receives a signal and is
selected bu G3TW0RK. )





If the running virtual processor calls WAIT and
there is a message in its message list (placed there v. hen
another VP signaled it) it will get the message and continue
to run. If the message list is empty it will place itself in
the wait state, schedule the first ready virtual processor,
and move it to the running state. The virtual orocessor will
remain in the waiting state until another running VP sends
it a message (via SIGNAL). It will then move to the ready
list. Finally it will be selected by GETWCPK, the next
instructions of WAIT will be executed, it will receive the





Messages are passed between virtual processors
by the instruction, SIGNAL, which uses four internal
procedures, SPIN_L0CK, ENTER_MSG_1IST , MAKE_READY, and
&ETWORK.
SPIN_L0CK, as explained above insures that only-
one virtual processor has control of the Virtual Processor
Table at a time.
ENTEE_MSG_LIST manages a FIFO message queue for
each virtual Processor and for free messages. This queue is
of fixed maximum length because of the implementation
decision tc restrict the use of SIGNAL. A running VP can
send no more than one message (SIGNAL) before it receives a
reply (i.e., WAIT's for a message). Therefore if thpre are N
virtual processors per real processors, the message queue
length, L, is:
L = N - 1
MAKE_READY manages the virtual processor ready
queue. If a message is sent to a V? in the waiting" state,
MAKE_READY wakes it up (it places it in the ready state) and
enters it in the ready list. If a running VP signals a
waiting VP of higher priority, it will place itself back in
the ready state and the higher priority VP will be selected.
The action taken by signal is as follows:
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SIGNAL Procedure (Message, Destina tion_VF ,i
Eegir.
Lock VFT (call SPIN_IOCK)
Send message (call ENTER_MSG_LIST)
If signaled VF is waiting Then
Wake it up and make it readv
(call MAKE READY)
end if
Fut running V? in ready state.







SWAP_VTPF contains the same processor switching
mechanism used in S>/AP_DBR t tut applies it to a virtual
processor rather than a real processor. Switching is quite
simple in this virtual environment because both processor
execution point and address space are defined by the
Descriptor Base Register. SWAP_VB3R is invoked bv the
Traffic Controller to load a new process on a virtual
processor in support of level-2 scheduling. It uses GETWORK
to control the associated level-1 scheduling. The action





Lock VFT (call SPIN_L0CK)
load running VP with New_LBR
Flace running VP in ready state





In this implementation one restriction is placed
upon the use of this instruction. If a virtual processor's
message list contains at least one message, it can not ^ive
up its current EBR. This problem is avoided as the natural
result of using SIGNAL and WAIT only for system events, and
"masking" preempts within the kernel. If this were
permitted, the messages would lose their context. (The
messages in a VP_MSG_LIST are actually intended for the
process loaded on the VP.)
d. IDLE
The ILLS instruction loads the Idle EBP on the
running virtual processor. Only virtual processors in




Controller is not even aware of virtual processors
permanently bound to kernel processes.^
IDLE has the same scheduling effect as
SWAPJTDBH, but it also sets the IDLE_FLAG on the scheduled
VF. The distinction is made between the Two cases because,
although the Traffic Controller must schedule an Idle
process on the VP if there are no other ready processes, the
Inner Traffic Controller does not wish to schedule an Idle
VP if there is an alternative. Tnis would be a waste of
physical processor resources. The setting of the IBLE_FLAG
by the Traffic Controller aids the Inner Traffic Controller
in making this scheduling decision. Logically, there is an
idle process for each VP; actually the same address space
(DBR) is used for all idle processes for the same CPU, since
only one will run at a time. As previously explained,
virtual processors loaded by this instruction will be
selected by GETWORK only to give the Idle process away for a
new process in response to a virtual preempt interrupt. The





Lock VFT (call S?IN_L0CK)
Load running- VP with Idle BSR
Set VP's ITLE.ILAG
Place running VP in ready state






SET_VPREE VIPT sets the preempt interrupt flag on
a specified virtual processor. This forces the virtual
processor into level-1 scheduling contention, even if it is
loaded with an Idle process. The instruction retrieves an
idle virtual processor in the same way a hardware preempt
retrieves an idle CPU by forcing the VP to "be selected by
GETWORK. The only difference between the two cases is the





Set VF's PREEMPT flag





Since the action is a safe sequence, no
deadlocks or race conditions will arise and no lock is
required on the VPT.
f. TEST_VPREEMPT
Within the kernel of a multiprocessor system all
process interrupts (which excludes system I/O interrupts)
are masked. If process interaction results in a virtual
preempt being sent to the running virtual processor by
another CPU, it will not be handled since GSTWORK has
already been invoked. TEST_VFREEMPT provides a virtual
preempt interrupt unmasking mechanism.
TEST_VPREEMPT mimics the action of a physical
CPU when interrupts are unmasked. It forces the process
execution point back down into the kernel each time the
process attempts to leave the kernel domain, where the
preempt flag of the running VP is examined. If the flag is
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off, TEST_VPREEMPT returns and the execution point exits
through the Gatekeeper into the supervisor domain of the
process address space as described above. However, if the
PREEMPT flap- is on, the TEST_VPREEMPT executes a virtual
interrupt handler located in the Traffic Controller. This
jump from the Inner Traffic Controller to the Traffic
Controller (TC_PREEMPT_HA,\DLER) is a close parallel to the
action of a CPF in response to a hardware interrupt, that is
a jump to an interrupt handler. The Traffic Cortroller
Preempt Handler forces level-2 and level-1 scheduling to
proceed in the normal manner. The preempt handler forces the
Traffic Controller to examine the APT and to applv the
level-2 scheduling algorithm, TC_GET TVORK. If the APT has
been changed since the last invocation of this scheduler, it
will he reflected in the scheduling selections. Eventually,
when the running VF's preempt flag is tested and found to he
reset, TEST_V?REEMPT will return to the Gatekeeper where the
process execution point will finally make a normal exit into














The Traffic Controller runs in a virtual environment
created by the Inner Traffic Controller. It sees a set of
running virtual processor instructions: SWAF_7LFR, IDLE,
5ET_VPREEMPT, and RUNNINGJTP, and provides a scheduler,
TC_GETWORK, which multiplexes processes on virtual
processors in response to process interaction. It also
creates a level -2 instruction set: ADVANCE, AWAIT, and
PROCESS_CLASS f which is available for use by higher levels
of the design. The Traffic Controller uses a global data
base, the ACTIVE PROCESS TA3LE to support its operation.
1. Active Frocess Table (APT)
The Active Frocess Table is a system-wide kernel
database containing entries for each supervvisor process in


















The structure of the APT closely parallels that of the
Virtual Processor Table. It contains a LOCK to support the
implementation of a mutual exclusion mechanism, a
RUNNING_LIST t and a READY_LIST_HEAD . The Traffic Controller
is only concerned with virtual processors that can be loaded
with supervisor processes. Since two V?'s are permanently
bound to kernel processes (the Memory Manager and the Idle
Process), they cannot be in contention for level-2
scheduling; the Traffic Controller is unaware of their
existence; since there are a number of available virtual
processors, the RUNNING_LIST was implemented as an array
indexed by VF_ID. The READY_LIST_HEAD points to a FIFO queue
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that includes both running and ready processes. The running
processes will he at the top of the ready list.
Because of their completely static nature, idle
processes require no entries in the APT. Logically, there is
an idle process at the end of the ready list for each VF
available to the Traffic Controller. If the ready list is
empty, TC_GETVORK loads one of these "virtual" idle
processes by calling IDLE, and enters a reserved identifier,
#IDLE, in the appropriate RUNNING_IIST entry. This
identifier is the only data concerning idle processes that
is contained in the APT. Idle process scheduling
considerations are moved down to level-1, "because the Inner
Traffic Controller knows about physical processors, and can
optimize CPU use by scheduling idle processes only when
there is nothing else to do.
The subject access class, S_CIASS, provides each
process with a label that is required by level-3 modules to
enforce, the SASS non-discretionary security policy.
2. level -2 Scheduling
Above the Traffic Controller, SASS appears as a
collection of processes in one of the three states: running,
ready, or blocked. Running and ready states are analogous to
the corresponding virtual processor states of the Inner
Traffic Controller. However, because of the use of

eventcount synchronization mechanisms by the Traffic
Controller, the blocked state has a slightly different
connotation than the VP waiting state.
Blocked processes are waiting for the occurrence of
a non-system event, e.g. t the event occurrence ray he
signalled from the supervisor domain. When a specific event
happens, all of the blocked processes that were awaiting
that event are awakened and placed in the ready state. This
broadcast feature of event occurrence is more powerful than
the message passing mechanism of SIGNAL, which must be
directed at a single recipient.
Just as SIGNAL and WAIT provide virtual processor
mul tiplixin* in level-1, the eventcount functions, ADVANCE
and AWAIT, control process scheduling in level-2.
a. TCJJ5TW0RK
Level-2 scheduling is implemented in the
internal Traffic Controller procedure, TC__GETWORK. This
procedure is invoked by eventcount functions when a process
state change may have occurred. It loads the first ready
process on the currently scheduled V? (i.e., the virtual
processor that has been scheduled at level-1 and is





VP_IL := R TJNNING_VP
Do while not end of ready list
if process is running then
get next ready process
else
RnNNING_LlST [VP_ID] := PROCESS_IE




If end of running list (no ready processes) Then





A source listing of TC_GETW0?.K is contained in
Appendix E.
h. TC_PREEMFT_EANDL3H
Preempt interrupts are masked while a process is
executing in the kernel domain. As tne process leaves the
kernel, the gatekeeper unmasks this virtual interrupt by
invoking TEST_VPREZMFT. This instruction tests the scheduled
VP's PP-ESMPT flag. If this flag is off, the process returns
to the Gatekeeper and exits from the kernel; "but if the f lag
is set, TESTJTPREEMFT calls the Traffic Controller's virtual
preempt interrupt handler, TC_PF.EEMPT_HANDLER . This handler
S3

invokes TC_GETVORK, which re-evaluates level-2 scheduling.
Eventually, when the schedulers have completed their
functions, the handler will return control to the preempted
process, which will return to te Gatekeeper for a normal
exit. This sequence of events closely parallels the action
of a hardware interrupt, hut in the environment of a virtual
processor rather than a CPU. The virtual izat ion of
interrupts provides the ability for one virtual processor to
interrupt execution of another that may, or may not, te
running on a CPU at that time. This is provided without
disrupting the logical structure of the system. This
capability is particularly useful in a multiprocessor
environment where the target virtual processor may be
executing on another CPU. 3ecause these interrupts will te
virtualized, the operating system will retain control of the
system. The action of the TCJPFJ32MPT_HANDLER is described in









?rocess_ID := RUNNING LIST [VP_ID]
If process is not idle Then






WAIT_LOCK and WAIT_UNLOCK provid* an exclusion
mechanism which prevents simultaneous multiple use of the
APT in a multiprocessor configuration. This mechanism
invokes 'WAIT and SIGNAL of the Inner Traffic Controller.
3. Even tcoun ts
An eventcount is a non-decreasing integer
associated with a global object called an event [11] . The
Event Manager, a level-3 module, controls access to event
data when required and provides the Traffic Controller with
a HANDLE, an INSTANCE, and a COUNT. The values for all
eventcounts (and sequencers) are maintained at the Memory
Manager level and are accessed by calls to the Merory
Manager. The HANDLE provides the traffic controller with an
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event ID, associated with a particular segment. INSTANCE is
a more specific definition of the event. For example, each
SASS supervisor segment has two eventcounts associated with
it, a INSTAMCE_1 and a INSTANCE_2, that the supervisor uses
keep track of read and write access to the segment [2].
Eventcounts provide information concerning system-wide
events. They are manipulated "by the Traffic Controller
functions ADVANCE and AWAIT and by the Memory Manager
functions, READ and TICKET. A proposed high level design for
ADVANCE and AWAIT is provided in Appendix C.
a. Advance
ADVANCE signals the occurrence of an event
(e.g., a read access to a particular supervisor segment).
The value of the eventcount is the number of ADVANCE
operations that have been performed on it. When an event is
advanced, the fact must be broadcast to all blocked
processes awaiting it and the process must be awakened and
placed on the ready list. Some of the newly awakened
processes may have a higher priority than some of the
running processes. In this case a virtual preempt,
SET_VPREEMPT (V?_ID), must be sent to the virtual processors




When a process desired to block itself until
a particular event occurs, it invokes AWAIT. This procedure
returns to the calling process when a specified eventcount
is reached. Its function is similar to WAIT.
c. Read
REAT returns the current value of the
eventcount. This is an Event Manager (level three) function.
This module calls the Memory Manager module to obtain the
eventcount value.
d. Ticket
TICKET provides a complete time-ordering of
possibly concurrent events. It uses a non-decreasing
integer, called a sequencer, which is also associated with
each supervisor segment. As with READ, this is an Event
Manager function that calls the Memory Manager to access the
sequencer value. Each invocation of TICKET increments the
value of the sequencer and returns it to the caller. Two
different uses of ticket will return two different values,
corresponding to the order in which the calls were made.
D. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
Eecause the Inner Traffic Controller's scheduler,
G-ETWORK, can accommodate both normal calls and hardware
B6

interrupt jumps, the problem of system initialization is not
difficult.
When SASS is first started at level-1, the Idle VP is
running and the memory manager VP, which has the highest
priority, is the first ready virtual processor in the ready
list. All VP's available to the Traffic Controller for
level-2 schedling are ready. Their IDLE_FIAG's and PPEEMFT
flags are set.
At level-2, all VP's are loaded with idle processes and
all supervisor processes are ready.
The kernel stack segment of each process is initialized






















All CPU registers and the supervisor stack pointer are
stored on the stack. R15 is reserved as the kernel stack
point? R14 contains the BER. All other registers can be used
to pass initial parameters to the process. The order in
which these registers appear on the stack supports the Z/ASM
block-move instructions.
The status block contains the current value of the stack
pointer, R15, and the preempt interrupt return flag. This
flag is set to indicate that the process has been saved by a
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preempt interrupt. The first three items on the stack: the
process entry point, the initial process flag control word,
and an interrupt indentifier, are also initialized to
support the action of a hardware interrupt.
To start-up the system, R14 (the DBR ) is set to the Idle
process DBR? the CPU Program counter is assigned the
PREEMPT _2NTRY point in GETWORKJ the CPU Flag Control Word
(FCW) is initialized for the kernel domain; and the CPU is
started. Because the Idle_VP is the lowest priority VP in
the system, it will place itself back in the ready state and
move the Memory Manager in the running state. The Memory
Manager will execute an interrupt return because the
interrupt return flag was set by system initialization.
There will be no Work for this kernel process so it will
call WAIT to place itself in the waiting state. The next
ready VP is idling, but since it's IDIE_FLAG and PREEMPT
flag are set, GETWORK will select it. It too will execute an
interrupt return, but because its PREEMPT flag is set, it
will call TC_PREEMPT_HANDIER. This will cause the first
ready process to be scheduled. Each time a supervisor
process blocks itself, the next idle VP will be selected and
the sequence will be repeated.
The action described above is in accord with normal
operation of the system. The only unique features of
S9

initialization are the entry point (PREEMPT-ENTRT : in
GETWOF.K) and the values in the initialized kernel stack.
The implementation presented in this thesis has been run
on a Z8000 developmental module. System initialization has
"been tested and executes correctly. At the current level of
implementation, no process multiplexing function is
available. There is no provision for unlocking the AFT after
an initialized process has been loaded as a result, a call
to the Traffic Ccntorller (viz., ADVANCE or AWAIT). In a
process multiplexed environment this would cause a system
deadlock. Once the process left the kernel domair with a
locked AFT, no process would be able to unlock it. The





The implementation presented in this thesis created a
security kernel monitor that runs on the ZS££0 Developmental
Module. This monitor supports multiprogramming and process
management in a distributed operating system. The process
executes in a multiple virtual processor environment which
is independent of the CPU configuration.
This monitor was designed specifically to support the
Secure Archival Storage System (SASS ) [1, 2, 3]. Fowever,
the inplementat ion is based on a family of Operating Systems
[4] designed with a primary goal of providing multilevel
security of information. Although the monitor currently runs
on a single microprocessor system, the implementation fully
supports a multiprocessor design.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because the Zilog MMU is not yet available for the Z£Zi2
Developmental Module, it was necesary to simulate the
segmentation hardware. As explained in Chapter IV, this was
accomplished by reserving a CPU register, 314, as a
Descriptor Ease Register (DBS) to provide a link to the
loaded addresss space. When the MMU becomes available, this
simulation must be removed. This can be done in two steps.
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First, the addressing format must be translated to the
segmented form. This requires no system redesign.
Second, the switching mechanism most he modified to
accomodated to use the MMU. This can he done by modifying
the SWAP_DBH portion of GETVORK to multiplex the MMU_IMAGE
onto the MMU hardware and this can be accomplished by
changing about a dozen lines of the existing code.
B. FOLLOW ON tfORX
Although the monitor appears to execute correctly, it
has not been rigorously tested. Before higher levels cf the
system are added, it is essential that the monitor be highly
reliable. Therefore a formal test and evaluation plan should
be developed.
An automated system generation and initialization
mechanism is also required if the monitor to be is a useful
tool in the development of higher levels of the design.
Once the monitor has been proven reliable and can be
loaded easily, work on the implementation of the Memory
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ADVANCE Procedure (HANDLE, INSTANCE)
Begin
Call WAIT_LOCK (APT)
! wake up !
PROCESS := EVENT_LIST_HEAD (HANDLE, INSTANCE)
COUNT := MM_ADVANCE_COUNT (HANDLE, INSTANCE)
! make ready !
Do while not end of READT_LIST




! initialize oreempt array !
Do for 7P_ID = 1 TO #NR_VP
RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID] .PREEMPT := #TRUE
end do
! find preempt candidates !
CANDIDATES :=
PROCESS := READY_LIST_HEAD
Do (for VP_ID := 1 to #NR_VP) and not end READY_LIST
If PROCESS = #RUNNING THEN
RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID] .PREEMPT := #FALSE
else
CANDIDATE := CANDIDATE +1
end if




! preempt candidates !
Do for VP_ID := 1 to CANDIDATES













PROCESS := RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID]
CURRENT_COUNT := MM_READ_COUNT (HANDLE, INSTANCE)
If CURRENT_COUNT < COUNT Then
Call THREAD_BLOCKED_LIST (HANDLE, INSTANCE, PROCESS)
PROCESS. HANDLE := HANDLE
PROCESS. INSTANCE := INSTANCE
PROCESS. COUNT := COUNT
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